* fix(image): scope local_id lookup by chat_id + use real column name `ImageResolver.get_image_md5` made two wrong assumptions about the production `MessageResourceInfo` schema, which made the decode_image MCP tool always fail with "无法找到 local_id=X 的图片信息": 1. The column is `message_local_id`, not `local_id`. The current query throws `sqlite3.OperationalError: no such column: local_id`, but the exception is swallowed by `except Exception: pass`, masking the real failure as a silent miss. 2. `message_local_id` is not globally unique. In production it repeats across chats, and within an active chat the same local_id can recur up to 7 times (observed on a real DB). The production schema scopes by `chat_id`, resolved from `ChatName2Id.rowid WHERE user_name = ?`. Fix: `get_image_md5` now takes `(username, local_id)`: - Resolve `username -> chat_id` via `ChatName2Id`. - Query `MessageResourceInfo` filtered by `chat_id + message_local_id + message_local_type == 3` (image type; high bits are session flags, so use `% 2^32`), ordered by `message_create_time DESC LIMIT 1`. External callers (`mcp_server.decode_image_tool` / `list_chat_images_tool`) already pass `username` through `ImageResolver.decode_image()` / `list_chat_images()`, so the public API is unchanged. Only the internal helper signature shifts. The existing test fixture in `test_decode_image_v2` used the same wrong schema as the buggy code (`CREATE TABLE MessageResourceInfo (local_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY, packed_info BLOB)`), so the tests passed against a self-consistent fiction. The fixture is rebuilt to match real columns plus `ChatName2Id`, and three regression tests are added: - cross-chat collision (same local_id in 3 chats; must pick the right one and not the type=43 video row) - same-chat reuse (same local_id, two timestamps; must pick the newer) - unknown chat (username not in ChatName2Id; structured error, no crash) All 154 tests pass locally (151 baseline + 3 new). * fix(image): surface get_image_md5 errors and use read-only DB open Two follow-ups on top of the chat_id scoping fix: 1. The bare `except Exception: pass` was the original failure mode: it silently swallowed `OperationalError: no such column: local_id` when the production schema diverged from the old `local_id` column name, masking the bug this PR fixes. Print the exception to stderr so future schema drift surfaces immediately instead of returning a misleading "image not found" error. 2. Open message_resource.db with `file:...?mode=ro` URI to match the rest of the project (monitor_web.py uses this idiom in 9 places). The DB is read-only for our purposes and a running WeChat may still hold it; using URI ro avoids any chance of lock contention. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
482 lines
21 KiB
Python
482 lines
21 KiB
Python
"""ImageResolver 在 V2 加密格式下的端到端解密测试。
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覆盖:
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- v2_decrypt_file 能正确还原 AES-ECB + XOR 混合加密的合成数据
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- decrypt_dat_file 按 magic 自动分发 V2 / V1 / 老 XOR 三条路径
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- ImageResolver 通过 __init__ 注入 aes_key/xor_key 后,能端到端解密 V2 .dat
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- 没传 aes_key 时遇到 V2 文件返回结构化错误,而不是 crash 或返回错误数据
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- 默认参数下老 XOR 路径不受影响,保持向后兼容
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"""
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import hashlib
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import os
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import sqlite3
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import struct
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import tempfile
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import unittest
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from Crypto.Cipher import AES
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from Crypto.Util import Padding
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from decode_image import (
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V1_MAGIC_FULL,
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V2_MAGIC_FULL,
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ImageResolver,
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decrypt_dat_file,
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v2_decrypt_file,
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)
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# 测试用 16 字节 AES key (任意值,仅用于合成测试数据)
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TEST_AES_KEY = b'1234567890abcdef'
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TEST_XOR_KEY = 0x37
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# 最小可识别的 PNG payload (含 IHDR 和 IEND chunk),长度 88 字节
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TEST_PNG_PAYLOAD = (
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b'\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n'
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+ b'\x00\x00\x00\rIHDR'
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+ b'\x00' * 64
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+ b'IEND\xaeB`\x82'
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)
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def _build_v2_dat(plaintext, aes_size, xor_size,
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aes_key=TEST_AES_KEY, xor_key=TEST_XOR_KEY,
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magic=V2_MAGIC_FULL):
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"""构造合成的 V2 / V1 .dat 字节串。
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布局: [6B magic][4B aes_size LE][4B xor_size LE][1B pad][AES-ECB][raw][XOR]
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aes_size / xor_size 是明文字段长度,AES 段做 PKCS7 padding 后向上对齐到 16 倍数。
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"""
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if aes_size + xor_size > len(plaintext):
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raise ValueError("aes_size + xor_size 超过 plaintext 长度")
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aes_plain = plaintext[:aes_size]
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raw_plain = plaintext[aes_size:len(plaintext) - xor_size]
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xor_plain = plaintext[len(plaintext) - xor_size:]
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cipher = AES.new(aes_key[:16], AES.MODE_ECB)
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aes_cipher = cipher.encrypt(Padding.pad(aes_plain, AES.block_size))
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xor_cipher = bytes(b ^ xor_key for b in xor_plain)
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header = magic + struct.pack('<LL', aes_size, xor_size) + b'\x00'
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return header + aes_cipher + raw_plain + xor_cipher
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class _FakeCache:
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"""ImageResolver 测试用最小缓存桩,绕过真实 DB 解密。"""
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def __init__(self, mapping):
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self._mapping = mapping
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def get(self, rel_key):
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return self._mapping.get(rel_key)
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def _make_resource_db(path, local_id, file_md5, username="wxid_test123",
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chat_id=1, message_create_time=1700000000,
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message_local_type=3, extra_rows=()):
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"""构造最小 message_resource.db, 表 schema 对齐真实微信结构。
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真实表里 message_local_id 不全局唯一 (跨 chat 重复, 活跃 chat 内也会复用),
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解析必须用 ChatName2Id.rowid -> chat_id 限定 + message_local_type=3 过滤图片。
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packed_info 里嵌入 extract_md5_from_packed_info 期望的 protobuf marker
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(\\x12\\x22\\x0a\\x20) 加 32 字节 ASCII hex MD5。
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Args:
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extra_rows: 额外 (chat_id, message_local_id, message_local_type,
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message_create_time, file_md5) 元组列表, 用于构造同 local_id
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跨 chat / 同 chat 多版本的歧义场景。
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"""
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marker = b'\x12\x22\x0a\x20'
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def _packed(md5_hex):
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return b'\x00' * 8 + marker + md5_hex.encode('ascii') + b'\x00' * 4
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conn = sqlite3.connect(path)
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try:
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conn.execute("""
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CREATE TABLE MessageResourceInfo (
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message_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY,
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chat_id INTEGER,
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sender_id INTEGER,
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message_local_type INTEGER,
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message_create_time INTEGER,
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message_local_id INTEGER,
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message_svr_id INTEGER,
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message_origin_source INTEGER,
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packed_info BLOB
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)
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""")
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conn.execute(
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"CREATE TABLE ChatName2Id (user_name TEXT PRIMARY KEY, update_time INTEGER)"
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)
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conn.execute(
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"INSERT INTO ChatName2Id (rowid, user_name, update_time) VALUES (?, ?, ?)",
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(chat_id, username, message_create_time),
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)
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next_msg_id = 1
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conn.execute(
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"INSERT INTO MessageResourceInfo "
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"(message_id, chat_id, sender_id, message_local_type, message_create_time, "
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" message_local_id, message_svr_id, message_origin_source, packed_info) "
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"VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",
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(next_msg_id, chat_id, 0, message_local_type, message_create_time,
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local_id, 0, 0, _packed(file_md5)),
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)
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next_msg_id += 1
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for extra in extra_rows:
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ex_chat_id, ex_local_id, ex_type, ex_ctime, ex_md5 = extra
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conn.execute(
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"INSERT INTO MessageResourceInfo "
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"(message_id, chat_id, sender_id, message_local_type, message_create_time, "
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" message_local_id, message_svr_id, message_origin_source, packed_info) "
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"VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",
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(next_msg_id, ex_chat_id, 0, ex_type, ex_ctime, ex_local_id, 0, 0, _packed(ex_md5)),
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)
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next_msg_id += 1
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conn.commit()
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finally:
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conn.close()
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class TestV2DecryptSynthetic(unittest.TestCase):
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"""v2_decrypt_file / decrypt_dat_file 在合成数据上的正确性"""
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def test_v2_round_trip_recovers_payload(self):
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# 合成 V2 .dat 解密后字节级等于原始 payload
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with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
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dat_path = os.path.join(td, "test.dat")
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with open(dat_path, 'wb') as f:
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f.write(_build_v2_dat(TEST_PNG_PAYLOAD, aes_size=32, xor_size=16))
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out_path, fmt = v2_decrypt_file(
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dat_path, aes_key=TEST_AES_KEY, xor_key=TEST_XOR_KEY
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)
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self.assertIsNotNone(out_path)
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self.assertEqual(fmt, 'png')
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with open(out_path, 'rb') as f:
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self.assertEqual(f.read(), TEST_PNG_PAYLOAD)
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def test_decrypt_dat_file_routes_v2_by_magic(self):
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# decrypt_dat_file 看到 V2 magic 应自动走 V2 路径
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with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
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dat_path = os.path.join(td, "test.dat")
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with open(dat_path, 'wb') as f:
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f.write(_build_v2_dat(TEST_PNG_PAYLOAD, aes_size=32, xor_size=16))
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out_path, fmt = decrypt_dat_file(
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dat_path, aes_key=TEST_AES_KEY, xor_key=TEST_XOR_KEY
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)
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self.assertIsNotNone(out_path)
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self.assertEqual(fmt, 'png')
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def test_decrypt_dat_file_v1_uses_fixed_key(self):
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# V1 magic 走固定 key,即便外部不传 aes_key 也能解密
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v1_fixed_key = b'cfcd208495d565ef' # md5("0")[:16],由 v2_decrypt_file 内部使用
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with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
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dat_path = os.path.join(td, "test.dat")
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with open(dat_path, 'wb') as f:
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f.write(_build_v2_dat(
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TEST_PNG_PAYLOAD, aes_size=32, xor_size=16,
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aes_key=v1_fixed_key, magic=V1_MAGIC_FULL,
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))
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out_path, fmt = decrypt_dat_file(
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dat_path, aes_key=None, xor_key=TEST_XOR_KEY
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)
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self.assertIsNotNone(out_path)
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self.assertEqual(fmt, 'png')
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def test_decrypt_dat_file_legacy_xor_route(self):
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# 老 XOR 格式 (无 V1/V2 magic),decrypt_dat_file 应回退到 xor_decrypt_file 不需要 aes_key
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xor_key = 0x37
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with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
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dat_path = os.path.join(td, "test.dat")
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with open(dat_path, 'wb') as f:
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f.write(bytes(b ^ xor_key for b in TEST_PNG_PAYLOAD))
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out_path, fmt = decrypt_dat_file(dat_path, aes_key=None)
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self.assertIsNotNone(out_path)
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self.assertEqual(fmt, 'png')
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def test_v2_accepts_str_aes_key_from_config(self):
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# 真实场景下 aes_key 来自 config.json,是 ASCII string 不是 bytes;
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# v2_decrypt_file 内部应自行 encode,避免 TypeError
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with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
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dat_path = os.path.join(td, "test.dat")
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with open(dat_path, 'wb') as f:
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f.write(_build_v2_dat(TEST_PNG_PAYLOAD, aes_size=32, xor_size=16))
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out_path, fmt = decrypt_dat_file(
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dat_path, aes_key=TEST_AES_KEY.decode('ascii'), xor_key=TEST_XOR_KEY,
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)
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self.assertIsNotNone(out_path)
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self.assertEqual(fmt, 'png')
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def test_v2_accepts_str_xor_key_from_config(self):
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# 与 aes_key 的 str 处理对称: config.json 里把 xor_key 写成 "0x88" / "136" 也应能正常解密
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with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
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dat_path = os.path.join(td, "test.dat")
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with open(dat_path, 'wb') as f:
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f.write(_build_v2_dat(TEST_PNG_PAYLOAD, aes_size=32, xor_size=16))
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out_path, fmt = decrypt_dat_file(
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dat_path, aes_key=TEST_AES_KEY, xor_key=hex(TEST_XOR_KEY),
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)
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self.assertIsNotNone(out_path)
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self.assertEqual(fmt, 'png')
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def test_v2_wxgf_payload_returns_hevc_format(self):
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# 微信 V2 动图 (wxgf 裸流 HEVC) 解密后 fmt='hevc',输出文件以 .hevc 结尾;
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# 当前 ImageResolver 不再向 JPEG 转 (那是 monitor_web 的职责),保持原样输出。
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wxgf_payload = b'wxgf' + b'\x00' * 84 # 88 字节,与 PNG payload 同长度,避免改 aes/xor sizes
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with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
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dat_path = os.path.join(td, "test.dat")
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with open(dat_path, 'wb') as f:
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f.write(_build_v2_dat(wxgf_payload, aes_size=32, xor_size=16))
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out_path, fmt = decrypt_dat_file(
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dat_path, aes_key=TEST_AES_KEY, xor_key=TEST_XOR_KEY,
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)
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self.assertIsNotNone(out_path)
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self.assertEqual(fmt, 'hevc')
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self.assertTrue(out_path.endswith('.hevc'))
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def test_v2_rejects_wrong_aes_key(self):
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# AES key 错时 detect_image_format 返回 'bin' (magic 不识别),v2_decrypt_file
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# 应拒绝写出 .bin 垃圾文件并返回 (None, None),让 caller 知道解密失败。
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with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
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dat_path = os.path.join(td, "test.dat")
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with open(dat_path, 'wb') as f:
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f.write(_build_v2_dat(TEST_PNG_PAYLOAD, aes_size=32, xor_size=16))
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wrong_aes_key = b'wrongkey00000000'
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out_path, fmt = v2_decrypt_file(
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dat_path, aes_key=wrong_aes_key, xor_key=TEST_XOR_KEY,
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)
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self.assertIsNone(out_path)
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self.assertIsNone(fmt)
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def test_v2_rejects_wrong_xor_key_jpg_trailer(self):
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# JPG 必须以 FF D9 (EOI) 收尾。XOR key 错时尾部 16 字节乱码,
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# FF D9 被破坏,触发尾部 magic 校验失败。
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jpg_payload = b'\xff\xd8\xff' + b'\x00' * 83 + b'\xff\xd9' # 88 bytes, FF D9 在末尾
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with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
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dat_path = os.path.join(td, "test.dat")
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with open(dat_path, 'wb') as f:
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f.write(_build_v2_dat(jpg_payload, aes_size=32, xor_size=16))
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# 翻转所有 XOR 字节: TEST_XOR_KEY ^ 0xff 保证每字节都错位
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out_path, fmt = v2_decrypt_file(
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dat_path, aes_key=TEST_AES_KEY, xor_key=TEST_XOR_KEY ^ 0xff,
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)
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self.assertIsNone(out_path)
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self.assertIsNone(fmt)
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def test_v2_rejects_wrong_xor_key_png_iend(self):
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# PNG 末尾 12 字节必须含 IEND chunk。XOR key 错时 IEND 被破坏。
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with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
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dat_path = os.path.join(td, "test.dat")
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with open(dat_path, 'wb') as f:
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f.write(_build_v2_dat(TEST_PNG_PAYLOAD, aes_size=32, xor_size=16))
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out_path, fmt = v2_decrypt_file(
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dat_path, aes_key=TEST_AES_KEY, xor_key=TEST_XOR_KEY ^ 0xff,
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)
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self.assertIsNone(out_path)
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self.assertIsNone(fmt)
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def test_v2_skip_xor_validation_when_xor_size_zero(self):
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# xor_size < 2 时没有 XOR 段(或样本不足以验证),不应触发尾部 magic 校验。
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# 构造 xor_size=0 的 PNG (整张图都在 AES + raw 段),xor_key 实际不参与解密。
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with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
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dat_path = os.path.join(td, "test.dat")
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with open(dat_path, 'wb') as f:
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f.write(_build_v2_dat(TEST_PNG_PAYLOAD, aes_size=32, xor_size=0))
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# xor_key 传 0 也应成功 (XOR 段长度 0)
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out_path, fmt = v2_decrypt_file(
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dat_path, aes_key=TEST_AES_KEY, xor_key=0x00,
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)
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self.assertIsNotNone(out_path)
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self.assertEqual(fmt, 'png')
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def test_v2_wxgf_skips_trailer_validation(self):
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# wxgf (HEVC 裸流) 没有强制 trailer signature,XOR key 错时也不应被尾部校验误杀
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# (wxgf 路径在 elif 链前面命中,直接 fmt='hevc',不进入 XOR 校验分支)。
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# 这里验证:即便 XOR key 错导致末尾字节乱码,只要 wxgf magic 在头部正确,
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# 仍按 hevc 输出 — 因为我们只校验 jpg/png,其他格式跳过。
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wxgf_payload = b'wxgf' + b'\x00' * 84
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with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
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dat_path = os.path.join(td, "test.dat")
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with open(dat_path, 'wb') as f:
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f.write(_build_v2_dat(wxgf_payload, aes_size=32, xor_size=16))
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out_path, fmt = v2_decrypt_file(
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dat_path, aes_key=TEST_AES_KEY, xor_key=TEST_XOR_KEY ^ 0xff,
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)
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self.assertIsNotNone(out_path)
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self.assertEqual(fmt, 'hevc')
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class TestImageResolverV2(unittest.TestCase):
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"""ImageResolver 端到端:从 local_id 到解密文件,验证 V2 keys 注入路径"""
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def setUp(self):
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self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
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self.addCleanup(self._tmp.cleanup)
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tmp = self._tmp.name
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self.wechat_base = os.path.join(tmp, "wechat")
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self.out_dir = os.path.join(tmp, "decoded")
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os.makedirs(self.out_dir, exist_ok=True)
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self.username = "wxid_test123"
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self.local_id = 42
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self.file_md5 = "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
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username_hash = hashlib.md5(self.username.encode()).hexdigest()
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img_dir = os.path.join(
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self.wechat_base, "msg", "attach", username_hash, "2025-08", "Img"
|
|
)
|
|
os.makedirs(img_dir, exist_ok=True)
|
|
self.dat_path = os.path.join(img_dir, f"{self.file_md5}.dat")
|
|
with open(self.dat_path, 'wb') as f:
|
|
f.write(_build_v2_dat(TEST_PNG_PAYLOAD, aes_size=32, xor_size=16))
|
|
|
|
self.db_path = os.path.join(tmp, "message_resource.db")
|
|
_make_resource_db(self.db_path, self.local_id, self.file_md5)
|
|
self.cache = _FakeCache({"message/message_resource.db": self.db_path})
|
|
|
|
def test_decode_image_v2_with_keys(self):
|
|
resolver = ImageResolver(
|
|
self.wechat_base, self.out_dir, self.cache,
|
|
aes_key=TEST_AES_KEY, xor_key=TEST_XOR_KEY,
|
|
)
|
|
result = resolver.decode_image(self.username, self.local_id)
|
|
self.assertTrue(result['success'], msg=result)
|
|
self.assertEqual(result['format'], 'png')
|
|
self.assertEqual(result['md5'], self.file_md5)
|
|
with open(result['path'], 'rb') as f:
|
|
self.assertEqual(f.read(), TEST_PNG_PAYLOAD)
|
|
|
|
def test_decode_image_v2_missing_aes_key_returns_error(self):
|
|
# 没传 aes_key 时遇到 V2 文件应返回 success=False,而不是 crash 或写入错误文件
|
|
resolver = ImageResolver(
|
|
self.wechat_base, self.out_dir, self.cache, aes_key=None,
|
|
)
|
|
result = resolver.decode_image(self.username, self.local_id)
|
|
self.assertFalse(result['success'])
|
|
self.assertIn('AES key', result['error'])
|
|
self.assertEqual(result['md5'], self.file_md5)
|
|
|
|
def test_decode_image_default_args_preserve_legacy_xor(self):
|
|
# 默认参数 (aes_key=None) + 老 XOR .dat 应保持向后兼容
|
|
os.unlink(self.dat_path)
|
|
legacy_xor_key = 0x37
|
|
with open(self.dat_path, 'wb') as f:
|
|
f.write(bytes(b ^ legacy_xor_key for b in TEST_PNG_PAYLOAD))
|
|
|
|
resolver = ImageResolver(self.wechat_base, self.out_dir, self.cache)
|
|
result = resolver.decode_image(self.username, self.local_id)
|
|
self.assertTrue(result['success'], msg=result)
|
|
self.assertEqual(result['format'], 'png')
|
|
|
|
def test_decode_image_disambiguates_local_id_across_chats(self):
|
|
"""同 local_id 跨 chat 重复时, 必须按 username -> chat_id 选对; 否则会拿到
|
|
别的 chat 的 MD5 (或视频 type=43 的 packed_info), 解出错图。
|
|
|
|
生产 DB 上同一个 message_local_id 实测会出现在 5+ 个不同 chat 里,
|
|
其中混有图片 (type=3) / 视频 (type=43) / 群聊 / 私聊, 必须 chat-scoped
|
|
+ type 过滤才能定位。
|
|
"""
|
|
os.unlink(self.db_path)
|
|
other_md5 = "f" * 32
|
|
video_md5 = "a" * 32
|
|
_make_resource_db(
|
|
self.db_path, self.local_id, self.file_md5,
|
|
username=self.username, chat_id=7,
|
|
message_create_time=1778487726,
|
|
extra_rows=[
|
|
# 另一个 chat 同 local_id 同图片类型, MD5 不同 —— 选错就拿这个
|
|
(5, self.local_id, 3, 1700000000, other_md5),
|
|
# 又一个 chat 同 local_id 但是视频 (type=43), 应被 type 过滤
|
|
(132, self.local_id, 43, 1750000000, video_md5),
|
|
],
|
|
)
|
|
# 给冲突 chat 也注册 user_name, 否则 chat-scope 等价
|
|
conn = sqlite3.connect(self.db_path)
|
|
conn.execute(
|
|
"INSERT INTO ChatName2Id (rowid, user_name, update_time) VALUES (5, ?, 0), (132, ?, 0)",
|
|
("other_chat_wxid", "video_chat_wxid"),
|
|
)
|
|
conn.commit()
|
|
conn.close()
|
|
|
|
resolver = ImageResolver(
|
|
self.wechat_base, self.out_dir, self.cache,
|
|
aes_key=TEST_AES_KEY, xor_key=TEST_XOR_KEY,
|
|
)
|
|
result = resolver.decode_image(self.username, self.local_id)
|
|
self.assertTrue(result['success'], msg=result)
|
|
# 必须拿目标 chat 的 MD5, 不是 other_chat 也不是视频
|
|
self.assertEqual(result['md5'], self.file_md5)
|
|
|
|
def test_decode_image_picks_latest_when_same_chat_local_id_reused(self):
|
|
"""活跃 chat 里 local_id 会被复用 (实测同 chat 同 local_id 最多 7 条);
|
|
默认应返回 message_create_time 最新的那张, 对应用户最近一次 reference。
|
|
"""
|
|
os.unlink(self.db_path)
|
|
old_md5 = "c" * 32
|
|
# self.file_md5 / self.local_id 在 _make_resource_db 默认插入为 "latest" 那条
|
|
_make_resource_db(
|
|
self.db_path, self.local_id, self.file_md5,
|
|
username=self.username, chat_id=1,
|
|
message_create_time=1778487726,
|
|
extra_rows=[
|
|
# 同 chat 同 local_id 但更早, 不应该被选中
|
|
(1, self.local_id, 3, 1700000000, old_md5),
|
|
],
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
resolver = ImageResolver(
|
|
self.wechat_base, self.out_dir, self.cache,
|
|
aes_key=TEST_AES_KEY, xor_key=TEST_XOR_KEY,
|
|
)
|
|
result = resolver.decode_image(self.username, self.local_id)
|
|
self.assertTrue(result['success'], msg=result)
|
|
self.assertEqual(result['md5'], self.file_md5)
|
|
|
|
def test_decode_image_unknown_chat_returns_error(self):
|
|
"""username 在 ChatName2Id 里找不到时, 应返回结构化错误而不是 crash 或乱选 row。"""
|
|
resolver = ImageResolver(
|
|
self.wechat_base, self.out_dir, self.cache,
|
|
aes_key=TEST_AES_KEY, xor_key=TEST_XOR_KEY,
|
|
)
|
|
result = resolver.decode_image("wxid_does_not_exist", self.local_id)
|
|
self.assertFalse(result['success'])
|
|
self.assertIn('wxid_does_not_exist', result['error'])
|
|
|
|
def test_decode_image_v1_no_aes_key_uses_fixed_key(self):
|
|
# V1 magic 不会被 is_v2_format guard 拦截 (V1 magic 是 \x07\x08V1, V2 是 \x07\x08V2);
|
|
# 即便 ImageResolver(aes_key=None), V1 文件也应通过 decrypt_dat_file 内置固定 key 解密
|
|
os.unlink(self.dat_path)
|
|
v1_fixed_key = b'cfcd208495d565ef'
|
|
with open(self.dat_path, 'wb') as f:
|
|
f.write(_build_v2_dat(
|
|
TEST_PNG_PAYLOAD, aes_size=32, xor_size=16,
|
|
aes_key=v1_fixed_key, magic=V1_MAGIC_FULL,
|
|
))
|
|
|
|
# xor_key 必须跟 _build_v2_dat 加密时用的一致,否则 XOR 段乱码,
|
|
# 触发新的尾部 magic 校验失败 (PNG IEND chunk 错位)。
|
|
resolver = ImageResolver(
|
|
self.wechat_base, self.out_dir, self.cache,
|
|
aes_key=None, xor_key=TEST_XOR_KEY,
|
|
)
|
|
result = resolver.decode_image(self.username, self.local_id)
|
|
self.assertTrue(result['success'], msg=result)
|
|
self.assertEqual(result['format'], 'png')
|
|
|
|
|
|
if __name__ == '__main__':
|
|
unittest.main()
|